Introduction
Saša Hajzler is an analytical journalist and editor, graduated in Law, and mastered in Real Estate Law and Management, as well as Human Rights and Democracy. She is based in Slovenia and is writing for several journals and news outlets, her specialization being critical/political ethnography. She is also a member of the Ljubljana-based grassroots and self-organized civil initiative Infokolpa, that regularly holds open assemblies frequented by locals and migrants, dealing with the right to move, freedom of stay, anti-militarization, anti-racism and anti-exploitation struggles. Infokolpa is horizontal by structure and method, promoting direct participation and autonomy. So far it has practiced border monitoring, litigation, direct aid, advocacy, and reporting on systematic denial of asylum and (chain) pushbacks in the region. Infokolpa is a member of Border Violence Monitoring Network and Transnational Migrant Coordination. Both are coalitions of multiple organizations, involved with documenting pushbacks by EU member state authorities along the Balkan route, and coordinating on a transnational scale in order to effectively challenge the racist and violent border regime and immigration policies in Europe and beyond.
*Interview to Yorgos Michailidis
What is the current situation of refugees in Slovenia and the Western Balkans? (numbers, trends, accommodation, procedures, stance of the public and integration)
According to Infokolpa, which systematically monitors the violation of the rights of refugees and migrants, Slovenia has carried out 28,235 return procedures to Croatia since the middle of 2018, with some people returning more than once. In fact, leaked documents confirm that the Slovenian Ministry of Interior has given instructions to employees to profile migrants according to ethnicity and to ignore asylum requests, resulting with a steep decline in asylum requests, as shown by the example of police station Črnomelj, on the border with Croatia, where 371 asylum applications were registered in May 2018, but only 13 in June the same year, after the incriminating instructions were issued on behalf of the police top.
According to data collected by Amnesty International, between the years 2017 and 2020, the numbers of migrants apprehended at the border has been rising ( from 1930 in 2017, to 14,592 in 2020), but less and less international protection requests were noted (from 76% in 2018 to 24% in 2020) out of 1,930 migrants apprehended at the national border, 1,476 applied for international protection (76% ratio).
Famous is also the case in which 108 persons were deported to Croatia on 19th of July 2019 in the area of Police station Ilirska Bistrica. The case was investigated by the Slovenian Ombudsman, who noted that, according to the timeline provided by the police, the average time taken to deal with each person at the station was approximately 7 minutes. Given such unrealistic timing, it is clear that the arrested persons were treated collectively and then collectively deported to Croatia, breaching their right to individual treatment and denying them the possibility to ask for asylum. This is merely one case, but there are many such cases where people who apply for asylum in Slovenia are denied this right and are taken to the border and handed over to the Croatian police. Through mass deportations, Slovenia is violating the right to protection from torture and collective deportation. In this way, the Republic of Slovenia is participating in chain returns by handing people over to Croatia despite the clear knowledge that they are at risk of violence and deportation to BiH. Chain returns via Slovenia have also been increasingly frequent in 2020 from Italy and Austria. Such mass expulsions have been recognized as a systemic violation of the principle of non-refoulement.
In addition to the already existing systematic violations at police stations, in 2020 the Slovenian police introduced detention of asylum seekers at the prison-like Centre for Foreigners in Veliki Otok near Postojna. This is a total institution, with the purpose to restrict freedom of movement of persons who are in the process of being removed from the country. A person who has no legal status in Slovenia may be detained in the centre for a period of six months, this can be extended for a further six months, or until deportation is carried out. The current legislation also allows for the detention of asylum seekers for a period of 3 months under certain conditions, but the practice of detention from June to October 2020 showed that the detention measure was often issued arbitrarily. The increasing number of complaints against detention orders is indicative of the illegality and arbitrariness of these practices. By July 2020, out of 99 complaints, the Administrative Court ruled that the detention was unlawful in 58 cases
In addition to violations of fundamental rights by the police, decision-makers have issued a majority of negative decisions in cases of Eritrean asylum-seekers: 18 out of 22 Eritrean nationals received negative decisions, unlike the practices of other European Union states, which grant 81% of Eritrean applicants status of international protection,aware of the fact that Eritrea is a military dictatorship.
In March 2021, the Slovenian Parliament approved amendments to the International Protection Act and the Foreigners Act, further worsening the protection of rights of migrants and refugees in Slovenia. The Slovenian Parliament could thus suspend the right to asylum when emergency measures are declared. Deportation would be possible if there are no systemic deficiencies in the asylum system in the neighbouring country and the person is not at risk of torture or ill-treatment. These are rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which Slovenia is already violating on a massive scale through mass readmission to Croatia. Despite numerous reports, testimonies, journalistic investigations and even court rulings, the brutal violence carried out by the Croatian police is not recognised as torture or ill-treatment in Slovenia, with 28,235 readmission carried out between 2018 and the end of August 2021.
Migrant workers and their right to family life have also been severely affected by the changes to the Foreigners Act. The law extends the time a worker has to work in Slovenia to two years before he or she can apply for a procedure that would entitle members of his or her immediate family to a temporary residence permit in Slovenia. Family reunification is further limited by the removal of salary supplements from the amount of income that the worker can show to prove his/her ability to support a family member. This hits the hardest the workers with low basic wages in cleaning, security, construction, industry, and logistics.
Due to the massive violations of fundamental rights, the Italian courts in Genoa and Rome have identified Slovenia as a country with systemic deficiencies in its asylum system. In the first case, in Genoa, the deportation of a Pakistani asylum seeker who had previously started the asylum procedure in Slovenia and then fled, was stopped due to the insufficiency of the Slovene asylum system and the risk of torture after deportation to Slovenia. In another case, a court in Rome found Italian readmissions illegal in a lawsuit brought by a Pakistani national deported from Italy to BiH via Slovenia and Croatia, due to Slovenia’s role in chain returns.
Slovenia’s violations of the right of access to asylum, protection against collective expulsion and protection against torture were also recognised by the Slovenian Administrative Court in December 2020 and the Supreme Court in April 2021, in a final judgment against the Slovenian police and the Ministry of the Interior, issuing them an order to allow an asylum seeker from Cameroon, who was twice illegally deported to Croatia by the Slovenian police, to return to Slovenia and access the asylum procedure.
Most importantly, Slovenia carries out mass pushbacks to Croatia under the pretext of applying the inter-state agreement on the readmission of persons whose border crossing or stay in Slovenia is illegal. This agreement allows for persons who have entered Slovenia irregularly from Croatia to be readmitted to the Croatian authorities through a fast and informal procedure within 72 hours after crossing the border. Such fast-track extradition is carried out without formalities, which means there is no possibility of appeal nor access to other legal remedy, which is in direct violation of the constitutional right to appeal.
Nota bene: In 2022, bilateral readmission agreements have become a preferred method of other countries as well, in an attempt to »legalize pushbacks« throughout the European borders.
A legal overview: pushbacks constitute violations of international law, including Article 13 of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, Article 13 of the ECHR – the right to an effective remedy, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR – procedural safeguards relating to the expulsion of foreigners. Pushbacks are further in violation of EU legislation, specifically Articles 18 – right to asylum), Art.19 – protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition, and 47 – the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial – of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 14 provides that everyone has the right to seek and enjoy a refuge from persecution in other countries. The right to asylum is also provided by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
So you see, if Slovenia »returns« migrants to Croatia, it may only do so if the applicant would be provided effective access to international protection, and without the risk of a pushback or torture/inhumane behavior. Since this is verifiably not the case, and Croatia tortures and pushes back migrants to Bosnia and Herzegovina, this means Slovenia is willfully ignorant and responsible for what is happening in the camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina and along the Balkanroute. Same goes for other countries which ill-treat migrants, deny them access to asylum procedures, deport them and violate their rights. All countries are bound by the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits them from transferring anyone, whether directly or indirectly, to a place where he or she would have a well-founded fear of persecution or would face a real risk of other serious human rights violations or abuses and this is irrespective of whether the person has formally requested or obtained international protection. This should be clear to everyone.
The situation in the rest of the Balkan countries is no different: overcrowded camps and detention centers, lack of healthcare and protection of women, lgbtqi and minors, non-existent functional integration policies, police violence at the (weaponized) borders, as well as institutional violence behind the borders, in total – a collage of violence and violation of the freedom of movement, as sponsored and supported by the EU.
In Greece there has been a heated debate about the illegal push-backs in the Aegean and the land-border between Greece and Turkey. Is there a similar situation in Western Balkans? Are there any significant differences?
The Evros event, in which military and police troops from Greece, Frontex and other European states »combated« unarmed folks, who were encouraged by Erdogan, could be more connected to the Belarus-Poland borders, where Belarus was considered to be the instigator of migrant movement toward the EU borders and was met with violence on the polish side. We can surely discuss other political players and where they are coming from in their motives, however this does not exclude the clearly racist governments in Greece or Poland (or elsewhere), with their acceptance and implementation of anti-migration policies. Another problem is that again, we discuss the (always) conflicting interests of nation states, what is missing, however, is the will and need of migrants themselves. Where do these people wish to be? In Turkey or Greece, or Germany? On one hand there are indeed countries which have been promised an entry to the EU (Turkey, BiH, etc.), but they have been pulled by the nose for too long, or it was a false narrative from the very beginning. On the other hand, however, we have prisons popping up like mushrooms after rain in Greece, with a generous contribution from the EU, and we have a complete inability to negotiate anything between ourselves. Slovenia is the first to say »we do not exploit or oppress anyone, so we should not suffer the consequences of France selling weapons in the Middle East«, but as we are interconnected, and as we are in the same economic and military pact – we share the responsibility. So if Slovenia maintains this position, and if it does not give asylum to people and pushes them back, then Slovenia is responsible for what is happening in hotspots in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And the same goes for Greece and Poland.
In more detail: the long-established image of the Balkans is one of a periphery to Europe. On the other hand, some small Balkan states see themselves as being at the very center or cradle of Europe and the civilization it represents. This is only to say that we are witnessing a political wrestling contest in which the main moves are a push and a pull, meaning that there is a shared responsibility on behalf of both the so-called center and so-called periphery, intertwining interests which go much beyond of what is available to the general public or what is being discussed. This is why you do not hear a lot of the weapons and technology companies which come from all over Europe and non-Europe, and which are key lobbyists with/for Frontex, an agency which recently came into the spotlight with The Frontex files and other leaked documents, such as the report from OLAF, the European Union’s anti-fraud agency, recently tackled by the news outlet Der Spiegel, where in over 120 pages one may read of the direct involvement of Frontex in the execution of illegal pushbacks in the Aegean Sea. Aside from Frontex there are other agencies, companies, hedge funds, trusts and informal (oligarchic or mafia) entities, which influence the fluctuation of non-monetary or monetary investments, projects, cashflows and power. Some do this through financial methods, some through diplomatic, and some through methods of pressure. Migration (freedom of movement for people) is normally considered to be the latter – a pressure tool for negotiations. So when it comes to small Balkan (or small European or large peripheral or externalized border) states, we can feel free to make the claim that these States use migrants as a political and economic bargaining tool, with the complicity and the direct support of the European Union. Proof of such complicity is the case when The Guardian uncovered how EU institutions and officials purposefully attempted to hide the fact that Croatia didn’t use the funds given to its government with an obligation to ensure »better border management« (which meant inspection of breaching of human rights of migrants on behalf of croatian police). Croatia did nothing about its borders, and the EU knew and tried to hide that from the public. Proof of the direct support of a migration policy which (among other things) produces pushbacks is the recent OLAF report.
Often as a satellite of the US, but also under pressure of its richer member-countries, it is the EU that contributes to making unsafe countries and makes agreements with unsafe countries, such as Turkey, and it is the same EU that oversees its member States’ border abuses and illegal pushbacks, which are enacted with the direct engagement of Frontex, and it is the EU which externalizes borders all the way to the Sahel. In such a way it becomes obvious, that the EU and the bordering countries are part of a larger transnational order, fueled by racism and exploitation. This is why activists worldwide also discuss border externalization, making a clear case, through examples such as the EU-Turkey deal, that satellite countries are pushing and pulling as much as they are being pushed and pulled when it comes to large infrastructure and economic deals and lobbying. For all of this to take place it has to be supervised, supported and administered from the European centers of power, through various actors, and sometimes from the center itself.
Could you evaluate the overall stance of the European Union? Are the above-mentioned phenomena peculiarities of the small Balkan states or is it a centrally emanating policy?
The short answer to that question is »follow the money«. Who funds policies and who executes them? The overall stance of the EU is no different from the stance of the interest of the countries or even better – transnational corporations where most of the profit, investment and other capital is concentrated. In a globalized world this means many things, and one of them is the economic and political stalemate in which the »second and third world« countries operate. Oddly enough, with so much throwing around of the word democracy for the past thirty years, our world is not so democratic after all: we cannot afford not to be a part of NATO, TTIP agreements, IMF/World Bank development blackmails or other pacts, which ultimately put many countries and autonomous or non-state actors in a subjugated position, effectively pressing on people’s lives. One good example in history which is countering »dominant politics from the center(s) of power«, and which is impossible nowadays, is the existence of the conditions (economic and diplomatic power of some countries) to form the Non-Aligned Movement in the 60s. Yugoslavia was one of the main actors in the Non-Aligned, along with India, Ghana, Egypt, Indonesia and other countries. Why is it special? Because these countries joined together not only on a diplomatic scale, but with very material projects against imperialism, (neo)colonialism, racism, occupation, hegemonic domination, and against great power and bloc politics. After Yugoslavia broke apart we are left with the Balkans, and Europe. After countries who prefer not to be considered Balkans were accepted into the EU »family«, we were left with the »not-yet EU« buffer zone, which brings us to the naming used in one of the questions above: Western Balkans. It is worth taking note that in a sense of geographical chrononyms, or better said, regional toponyms, there may indeed be an eastern, western or northern and southern region of a »peninsula«, however appointing this is not the idea behind the origin of the term in question. As dr. Tanja Petrović from the Scientific Research Center of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (ZRC SAZU) notes, Western Balkans is actually a political naming, which best showcases the employment of (neo)colonial attitudes of the European center toward entities which are not (yet) considered a “part of the European family”. In a sense we are talking about a “politics of exclusion” on behalf of the EU toward what it considers to be a periphery to its great political and economic project. The name Western Balkans thus stands clearly for countries that are not included in the “EU family”, purposefully erasing the political potential of the region by tying it merely to the EU project, whereas the region has historically had substantial political and economic ties to other (and Othered) parts of the world, which have for some time now been named “The Third/Developing” world, precisely through the workings of the same logic as I describe above. Surely, one may say the political geography of our world is clear within those lines: the EU and other political entities of the developed West (or North, as it was known in the past) shape such discourse basing it on »facts«, isn’t that so? After all, this West/North is »predominant« in economic and humanistic terms – quality of life and human rights are its two most treasured parade horses standing in stark contrast to the rest of the world. In economic terms, however, we may in fact for some time now see a shift of the predominance toward the East, contributing to the fall of the West, resulting with its revenge, fueled by the well-known global mechanisms of a permanent crisis. Now, when it comes to the liberal institute of human rights – the failure of the West (or rather North) is most clear in the matter of refugee and migrant rights. For example Slovenia, whose past intellectuals tried really hard to separate from the political geography of the Balkans (and succeeded to do so in the 1990s), has been considered a “border guard of Europe” by migrants and freedom of movement activists around the world. Why? Because it violates human rights, executes pushbacks/collective expulsions, denies asylum, technologizes and attempts to militarize borders, overcrowds detention centers, lacks housing and healthcare policies, lacks efficient family reunification procedures, lacks just migrant labor laws and in fact has a track record of migrant labor abuses without proper inspection, accompanied by a public narrative and institutional action which is more than often racist in its essence. The war in Ukraine and the emergence of a new migrant route – Lithuanian-Polish-Belarussian route, are making clear these perspectives through vivid imagery: white migrants and refugees had a red carpet and piano music, the other ones were left to freeze and were beaten with batons. For those of us who followed what was happening along the Balkan route in the last six years, it is clear that the same occurred on the border with Poland and Belarus in a matter of a few months.
In conclusion: Africans ask how come their resources are mined, exploited and shipped out of Africa without a visa, while the people do? Yes, many people are more than often left with nothing other than abandoning or fleeing their exploited lands, but even if that was not the case, and if it was just a case of people just wanting to go into the world and see it, experience it, I don’t see why is that a problem? In the same way it is ridiculous how migration is considered to be a »security« issue in the mainstream narratives sponsored by states with such interest, instead of it being, for example, an economic issue. How come nobody questions the implementation of the visa system, which is based on global inequality? On average people from non-european/non-western geographies pay five times as much for tourist visas compared to western Europeans. And I can not emphasize enough how impossible it gets for work or immigration visas. Personally, I am also unsure of why is there a tendency to observe migrants, refugees (or people on the move, if you will), in an institutionalized, liberal discourse, exclusively as victims, as if we need some kind of a terror or trauma for people to just move. Moving is what people do, since the dawn of the day. So migrants today are the main protagonists and advocates of the most crucial and basic right which is the right to move and have mobility.
What are the main pillars of this EU policy in your opinion and what are the latest trends?
Control of profit and population behavior, broadly speaking. The »influx« of migrants is welcomed for specific type of labor and under specific conditions, these lives are usually invisibilized and disposable, and they are here to maintain the machinery which keeps the aging European population healthy and comfortable, and the profits coming. The interest is such. The trends change. From colonialism to neocolonialism, from war to hybrid war, from externalizing borders in Bosnia and Herzegovina to externalizing borders in Mali and Niger. The borders are moving. Other than technologization of borders and internal databases, weaponization of border crossings and police, methods include biopolitical and necropolitical practices which are too complex to get into right now, but they are firmly based in the efforts to depoliticize the population and assimilate and include migrants into the machinery of exploitation, if possible. One of the main pillars is also to consider this a security issue. Another is to erase possible mechanisms which reestablish migration on a new ground: nobody discusses the Nanssen passport, the end of Visa regime, the ending of exploitation of resources elsewhere, exit from NATO, resetting the economy to cover the basics and exclude what David Graeber calls »bullshit jobs«, a straightforward attack on financial, investment and other exploitative & profit-oriented entities, demounting oligarchic and monopolistic or multinational cooperative businesses which harm the regional and local economies and instead build communal regenerative networks. Giving up on comfort is still a no-go for many, and comfort is most definitely one of the pillars which contributes to political illiteracy here and reproduction of exploitation elsewhere, where eyes cannot see…
Let’s talk about the other side now. Apart from the state-discriminatory policies, a pro-refugee movement (or pro-refugee initiatives and organizations) is also active. What do you think that this movement should aim for, what is the best way for it to be organized. Do you think it has been growing and getting stronger? If not, what should be done in your view? (what’s missing)
It is maybe useful to consider the other side to be in pursuit and demand for freedom of movement. In my humble opinion it is solid and consistent, however, the urgency of the neoliberal world is capturing political potential from various spheres, and pushing very connected movements away from each other. What is a transnational freedom of movement without the movement for the right to stay, or without dignity for workers and (reproductive) laborers, or without struggles against multinational companies, financial institutions and exploitative projects, such as the ones recently being sold to the public as »green transit« projects? The struggles against pushbacks are struggles against a specific consequence of a broader policy of migration, which is a consequence of broader economic and infrastructure interests (lately the question of energy comes up), which is not far from labor, profits and technology (including businesses which profit from military), etc. etc. Surely, these are all different issues, but as one famous philosopher once said, one cannot fight the ecological apocalypse with ecology movements. It is like planting a tree in concrete and sand – it dries up. First we need to stop the ones who profit from concrete and sand. Same goes for migration – it is a political question of the very system of (re)production and profits and its mechanisms. It is therefore time for a more holistic approach, encompassing the lives of humans in total, and in the world as a whole, really looking deep into the interconnectedness, and points in which we can turn our logic of how we see the world completely upside down if necessary. Mapping the ways in which we are interdependent, not only materially, but also non-materially, from each other, but also of the environment and non-human lifeforms – this is one of the steps. So in some way the anti-neoliberal protests around the globe in 2019 were a good start, but it was also exemplary how a crisis (Covid-19) overturned this possibility. In any case, protests perhaps won’t do the job this time. Perhaps it is time to go underground and build a very firm and clear, well-thought through and long-term project: both political and infrastructural, including economic, even survivalist. A global network able to function for itself and sustain itself. And to recapture ecology and take it back from the neoliberal structures which translate »green« into outsourced misery and exploitation.
There’s a lot of talk about the role of the NGO’s. Could you provide us with your overall view according to your experience?
If you hear migrant testimonies along any route, you will find out that they don’t find help from NGOs but from locals. NGOs need a crisis in order to justify their own existence. Surely some are doing a good job, but it is not the type of political work which needs to be done, to erase the conditions under which crisis is formed and maintained, the type of crisis which produces politically illiterate subjects and humanitarianism which feeds the work of NGOs, which can be described as a putting a band aid to a torn limb.
